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OIL AND GAS CASE LAW UPDATE 
Thomas A. Daily 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ARKANSAS OIL AND GAS LAW (CIRCA 2015) 
BY THOMAS A. DAILY1 
Hard as it is to believe, it is that time again. Another year has come and gone. 
Oil and gas prices are even lower than last year. Yada, yada. The slowdown in the 
industry failed to slow the litigation, as you will see. Let’s get started. 
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT ARKANSAS’ INTEGRATION PROCESS IS CONSTITUTIONAL Since 
early in the 20th Century, states have sought to regulate the recovery of underground oil 
and gas within their boundaries. Such regulation is made necessary by the common law 
rule of capture which would otherwise prevail. At common law, as long as I stay physically 
within my land,2 any oil or gas which comes up in my well or wells is mine to keep, without 
liability to you, the neighbor under whose land that oil and gas was parked, prior to being 
captured by me. You have a perfectly good remedy for that, you see. You may simply 
employ the rule of capture’s “evil twin”3 the offset drilling rule, which gives you the right to 
drill your own wells and capture back from me. The end result was often unfair and, even 
worse, resulted in improvident production, thus wasting precious oil and gas.4 
                                            
'Member, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Fort Smith and Adjunct Professor, University of 
Arkansas School of Law. 
2And its downward extension. 
3So named by Professors Anderson and Kramer in their leading article, Bruce M. 
Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture—an Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 
ENVTL. L. 899 (2005) (offering a thorough discussion of the application of the Rule of 
Capture to Oil and Gas Production). 
4See Thomas A. Daily, Rules Done Right-How Arkansas Brought its Oil and Gas 
Law Into a Horizontal World, 68 Ark. L. Rev. 259 (2015) (offering a history of Arkansas’ oil 
and gas regulatory development). 
82015 Ark. 238, 464 S.W.3d 453 (2015). 
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The statutes and rules thus developed included, in most producing jurisdictions, some 
sort of arrangement whereby state agencies established drilling units for the sharing of the 
costs and product of unit wells, along with a mechanism to require the inclusion of all owners, 
whether or not those owners voluntarily elected to participate.1 The latter process is variously 
called “forced pooling,” “statutory pooling” or “integration,” its Arkansas name. Not 
surprisingly, these processes have been challenged on constitutional grounds. Those 
challenges have been consistently unsuccessful.2 It is a bit surprising that the first and only 
such challenge to reach the Arkansas Supreme Court waited until 2015.3 The vehicle was 
Richard Gawenis v. Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission.4 5 6 7 
Richard Gawenis owns the minerals beneath a .69 acre tract, integrated by 
                                            
1Martin & Kramer, Williams and Meyers Oil and Gas Law § 905.1 (2011); Texas is a 
notable exception, as are some Appalachian states. 
2See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. State of Indiana, 1 U.S. 90 (1900); Palmer Oil Corp. v. 
Amerada Petroleum Corp., 343 U.S. 390 (1952); Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 320 U.S. 222 
(1943); Marrs v. Oxford, 32 F. 2d. 134 (8th Cir. 1929); In Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Baker, 
197 F. 2d. 647 (10th Cir. 1952); Helmerich & Payne v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 136 Kan. 
254, 14 P. 2d. 663 (1932); Superior Oil Co. v. Foote, 214 Miss. 857, 59 S.W. 2d. 85 (1952); 
Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 481 So. 2d. 1326 (La. 1986); Sylvania Corp. v. Kilborne, 28 
N.Y. 2d. 427, 271 N.E. 2d. 524 (1971); Layton v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 1963 Okla. 140, 
383 P 2d. 624 (1963); Ward v. Corporation Commission, 1972 Okla. 122, 501 P. 2d. 503 
(1972); Martin & Kramer, Williams and Meyers Oil and Gas Law § 905.1 (2011); Summers Oil 
and Gas § 4.39 (3rd Ed., 2004); Kuntz Oil and Gas § 77.4 (a) (1991). 
3The author is aware of one earlier failed attempt to attack Arkansas integration 
on constitutional grounds. In its unpublished opinion in Lindquist v. Arkansas Oil and 
Gas Commission, 2000 WL 696414 (2000), the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the 
circuit court’s ruling that the constitutional argument was not properly raised before the 
7 and Gas Commission, and thus refused to consider it. 
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Commission order. Gawenis was given the standard list of options from which to elect. He 
could lease his mineral interest to anyone willing to take it, at a price and upon terms mutually 
acceptable; he could be deemed leased to the participating parties on the terms which the 
Commission found to be fair and reasonable;9 he could participate in the proposed well or he 
could be carried as a non-consenting owner, pending recovery of 400% of drilling, 
completing and equipping costs, along with 100% of operations costs incurred thereafter. Mr. 
Gawenis elected none of the above. Rather, he challenged the authority of the Commission 
to integrate his interest in the first place. Boiled down, his arguments were two. First, 
Gawenis claimed that the integration statute constitutes a prohibited taking of his property 
without just compensation. 
Second, he contended that the “taking” which occurred entitled him to a jury trial on the issue 
of compensation, which he was unconstitutionally denied. 
The circuit court ruled against Mr. Gawenis, so he appealed. Because the case 
involved a challenge to the constitutionality of an Arkansas statute, it went directly to the 
Supreme Court. As expected, the Supreme Court upheld the statute and the integration 
process, rejecting all of Mr. Gawenis’ arguments. 
There are three good reasons why an integration does not constitute an 
unconstitutional taking. The first is the favorite of the this author when he is thinking like a law 
professor. It goes back to the bad old rule of capture. Remember the plight of you, the poor 
neighbor. Your only remedy, when my well recovered oil and gas from 9 
                                            
9A bonus of $938.36 per mineral acre, a 1/5 royalty and a one year primary term. 
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beneath your land, was to drill your own well and do likewise.10 The integration of which Mr. 
Gawenis complained was part of Arkansas’ comprehensive Oil and Gas Conservation Act.11 
That act, for the first time, modified the rule of capture to give owners, such as you and Mr. 
Gawenis, a correlative right to share in the common source of supply below your properties 
without having to drill your own wells. Before the Conservation Act no such right existed. 
Thus, had it not been for the very statute which he challenged, Mr. Gawenis had no property 
interest which could have been taken. It is not a “taking” if you give a right to someone that is 
conditioned upon it being exercised in a prescribed manner. 
Good reason number two is the one most commonly recited as the basis of affirming 
the constitutionality of integration/pooling statutes. It is that such statutes are legitimate 
exercises of the states’ police powers. The idea of the police power is inherent in 
constitutional theory. States are bound to protect the health, safety and welfare of their 
citizens. For that reason, individual constitutional rights are not absolute. Just as private 
property rights must yield to land-use regulation, such as a zoning ordinance, the state may 
legitimately adopt a regimen designed to exploit its fugacious natural resources more 
efficiently than that which would result from the unregulated rule of capture. The limit of the 
police power is reasonableness. A regulation must be legitimately related to a public interest 
and it must be reasonable in 
10That Arkansas has adopted the Rule of Capture was first recognized by our 
Supreme Court in Osborn et al. v. Arkansas Territorial Oil & Gas Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 
122 (1912). 
"Act No. 105 of 1939, codified, as amended, as Ark. Code Ann. §§ 15-72-101, et 
seq. 
12Supra. 
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its result. For example, a regulation which prohibited drillng a well within X-feet of an existing 
well would be unconstitutional, unless it also provided a mechanism for the person prohibited 
from drilling his own well to share in the well which caused the prohibition. Arkansas’ 
integration statutes do exactly that, so the Conservation Act and its integration provisions are 
valid exercises of the police power and do not constitute a “taking.” 
A third theory which sustains the constitutionality of integration concedes that 
integration effects a taking of a property right. However, it posits that the options offered to 
the non-consenting party constitute “just compensation.” For that reason, the taking does not 
violate the constitution. 
In some jurisdictions it may not matter which theory or combination of theories are 
adopted to sustain constitutionality. However, Arkansas has a constitutional provision which 
guarantees a jury trial to determine compensation in eminent domain cases. The Oil and Gas 
Commission is unequipped to provide such a jury determination. Moreover, by the nature of 
the integration process, the delay inherent in providing the traditional jury trial would 
significantly retard development. 
In sustaining the constitutionality of the Arkansas statute, the Supreme Court relied 
upon the first two reasons above. The Court’s opinion, authored by Chief Justice Hanna, 
noted that Arkansas had adopted the Rule of Capture in Osborn12 and then quoted from the 
early Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in Anderson v. Corporation 
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Commission13 which had upheld that state’s force pooling process for reasons numbered one 
and two. Thus, Chief Justice Hanna’s opinion also held that the integration process was a 
legitimate exercise of this state’s police power. 
The opinion rejected Mr. Gawenis’ jury trial argument. Since no “taking” had occurred, 
the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial was inapplicable to the integration process. 
The Supreme Court’s decision was not unanimous. Justice Hart dissented. She 
concluded that Mr. Gawenis was unconstitutionally deprived of a jury trial. Her short 
dissenting opinion is interesting, though confused. Here it is, in full: 
Richard G. Gawenis argues that he is entitled to a jury trial under the Arkansas 
Constitution. The majority, however, declines to address the issue. Because Gawenis 
is correct, I respectfully dissent. 
The Arkansas Constitution provides as follows: 
No property, nor right of way, shall be appropriated to the use of 
any corporation, until full compensation therefor shall be first 
made to the owner, in money; or first secured to him by a deposit 
of money; which compensation, irrespective of any benefit from 
any improvement proposed by such corporation, shall be 
ascertained by a jury of twelve men, in a court of competent 
jurisdiction, as shall be prescribed by law. 
Ark. Const., art. XII, § 9. 
The Commission approved SEECO's application to integrate all unleased and 
uncommitted mineral interests. There is no jury trial at the Arkansas Oil & Gas 
Commission. Thus, if the integration process appropriates Gawenis's property, then 
the whole integration system is unconstitutional. 
Though the majority does not address the issue, it concludes that the 
forced-integration provisions of the Arkansas Conservation Act do not 
                                            
13327 P.2d 699 (1957). 
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take anything away from Gawenis because the integration order allowed 
Gawenis to lease his interest in the drilling unit in exchange for compensation or 
to participate in the drilling of the well and receive monetary benefits. 
The integration order, however, does not account for secondary recovery 
methods that SEECO will utilize to cause the gas to migrate to SEECO's well. 
Minerals are fugacious when there is escape, seepage, or drainage that occurs 
as a result of the tapping a common reservoir; in the Fayetteville Shale, 
however, the gas is primarily nonfugacious, thus owing to the need for 
secondary recovery methods. See Young v. Ethyl Corp., 
521 F.2d 771, 774 (8th Cir.1975) (discussing fugacious and nonfugacious 
brine). In Jameson v. Ethyl Corporation, 271 Ark. 621, 609 S.W.2d 346 (1980), 
this court stated that the law should not “permit those persons who are in an 
economically advantaged posture to be able to gain negotiating clout by being 
allowed to undertake, with impunity, processes that go beyond extracting 
transient minerals or [gases] which have drained or flowed by natural process to 
their drilling sites.” Id. at 626, 609 S.W.2d at 350. The Jameson court cited 
Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil & Gas Company, 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122 
(1912), where this court adopted the rule of capture, noting that petroleum, gas, 
and oil belong to the owner of the land and are part of it so long as they are part 
of it or in it or subject to his control, but when they escape and go into other land 
or come under another's control, the title of the former owner is gone. The 
Jameson court, however, noted that Osborn did not involve a secondary 
recovery process. The Jameson court recognized the obligation of the 
extracting party to compensate the owner for any special damages that may 
have been caused to the property. Similarly, Gawenis is entitled to 
compensation for any special damages that may be caused to his property by 
secondary recovery methods, such as fracking. See O'Brien v. Primm, 243 Ark. 
186, 419 S.W.2d 323 (1967) (concluding that defendants were negligent in 
conducting the sand-frac operation and that such negligence was a proximate 
cause of damage to a water well); Young, 
521 F.2d at 775 (concluding that a landowner had a vested existing property 
right in the brominated salt water underlying his land and that a party's act of 
forcibly removing the solution by means of injection and production wells 
constituted an actionable trespass). Thus, SEECO has appropriated Gawenis's 
property, and Gawenis is entitled to a jury trial to determine his full 
compensation. 
Justice Hart misunderstands both “fugacious” and “secondary recovery.” In general 
usage, the word “fugacious” means “[F]lying or disposed to fly; fleeing away; 
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hence, lasting but a short time; evanescent; volatile.14 As used in the context of mineral 
law, “fugacious” means liquid or gaseous minerals, as opposed to solid minerals. As thus 
defined, gas is clearly fugacious, though, admittedly, gas does not move through shale as 
easily as through sandstone. Justice Hart confused contents with their container, 
apparently concluding that because gas within the relatively impermeable Fayetteville 
Shale does not easily migrate, it is not fugacious. That is like saying soda in a bottle is not 
fugacious, because it has become trapped there. That is not correct but, after some 
head-scratching, I got the point. By trapping a fugacious substance you do not make it 
non-fugacious. You just trap it. Let it out and you will see how fugacious it remained.15 Still, 
I know what she meant, so let us go on. 
Justice Hart also misunderstands the meaning of “secondary recovery.” Secondary 
recovery is a process which involves injecting substances into a separate borehole in 
order to force their movement into a production well.16 Secondary recovery takes place in 
oil reservoirs, not dry gas reservoirs such as the Fayetteville Shale, because liquids can 
be pushed, but gases cannot. Still, Justice Hart appears certain that SEECO intends to 
remove gas from beneath Mr. Gawenis’ tract by use of secondary recovery. I suspect that 
she is actually referring to SEECO’s plan to frack 
14Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition. 
15Justice Hart is not alone in her misuse of “fugacious.” She cites to Young v. Ethyl 
Corp., 521 F.2d 771, 774 where the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concludes that unlike 
oil and gas, brine is not a fugacious mineral, apparently because, like oil, it responds to 
waterflood style secondary recovery. Young was a good decision but its misuse of 
“fugacious” has puzzled many over the years. 
16See Howard R. Williams and Charles J. Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms 
(Sixteenth Edition), LexusNexus, 2015, pp. 962-3. 
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the reservoir during completion of its wells. Apparently, Justice Hart thinks that fracking 
is a type of secondary recovery. Not so. Fracking is a process used in well stimulation. 
Stimulation of a well is not secondary recovery.17 Contrary to her apparent conclusion, 
SEECO will never use secondary recovery to produce gas from the Fayetteville Shale 
or from anywhere else. However, it will frack its wells, to be sure. 
Next, Justice Hart misapplies the decisions upon which she relies. Young v. 
Ethyl Corp.18 and Jameson v. Ethyl Corp.19 were cases involving a brine operator’s use 
of brine injection wells, using brine disposal wells to inject previously processed brine 
and thus force unprocessed bromine-enriched brine in the direction of its brine 
production wells. That process certainly qualifies as secondary recovery. However, it is 
neither a violation of rights nor a taking, per se. The legal problem in those cases was 
that Ethyl Corp. had no leases from Young or Jameson and, at that time, Arkansas had 
no statutory mechanism to include such owners into brine production units.20 Indeed, 
The supreme court’s majority opinion in Jameson says just that: 
While Arkansas' unitization laws are not, as previously noted, involved in this 
case, we do believe that the underlying rationale for the adoption of such 
laws, i. e., to avoid waste and provide for maximizing recovery of 
                                            
"Manual of Oil and Gas Terms, supra, p 1014, which defers to W. Va. Code § 
22-4-1(u) (Cum. Supp. 1980) as “any action taken by well operator to increase the inherent 
productivity of an oil or gas well including, but not limited to, fracturing, shooting or acidizing, 
but excluding cleaning out, bailing or workover operations.” (Emphasis added). 
18Supra. 
19271 Ark. 621, 609 S.W.2d 346 (1980). 
20That was remedied by the enactment of Arkansas’ Brine Conservation Act, Act No. 
937 of 1979, codified as Ark. Code Ann. §§ 15-76-301 et seq. 
212015 Ark. App. 555. 
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mineral resources, may be interpreted as expressing a public policy of this 
State which is pertinent to the rule of law of this case. Inherent in such laws is 
the realization that transient minerals such as oil, gas and brine will be wasted if 
a single landowner is able to thwart secondary recovery processes, while 
conversely acknowledging a need to protect each landowner's rights to some 
equitable portion of pools of such minerals. 
Of course, the constitutionality of one of Arkansas’ unitization laws is exactly what 
Gawenis is about. Unlike Young and Jameson, Mr. Gawenis was included in the unit 
and stands to receive his share of unit production. It is difficult to imagine how “a public 
policy of this State” is unconstitutional. 
If there is a lesson to be learned from Justice Hart’s dissenting opinion in 
Gawenis, it has nothing to do with law. Rather, the lesson is that most judges do not 
have a clue about oil and gas law. Whenever in court, spoon-feed everything like it was 
pablum and pray. 
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS RULING CONFIRMS COMMON LAW PRINCIPLE THAT 
POSSESSION OF ONE CO-TENANT IS NOT ADVERSE TO OTHER CO-TENANTS 
SEECO, Inc. v Holden21 was an ownership dispute between two owners. One 
owned both the surface and a one-half mineral interest. The other was the descendant 
of a previous owner who sold the land to the surface owner’s predecessor in 1912, 
reserving the other one-half mineral interest. The surface owner claimed title to the 
severed interest, as well, by virtue of tax deed resulting from a purported 1958 forfeiture 
of that severed one-half interest. 
However, that 1958 forfeiture was clearly void for failure of the tax assessor to properly 
assess the severed interest, prior to the purported forfeiture. The owner 
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whose severed interest was purportedly forfeited sued to quiet title to that interest. In 
response, the surface owner contended that the suit was barred by limitations. She 
contended that her possession (her lessee had commenced drilling wells on the contested 
lands more than two years prior to commencement of the quiet title suit) precluded the suit. 
An Arkansas statute bars a person who has been dispossessed by a tax purchaser for more 
than two years from maintaining a quiet title suit.22 
The trial court ruled in favor of the surface owner, but the Arkansas Court of Appeals 
reversed. In so doing, the appeals court confirmed that Arkansas adheres to the majority 
rule that production of minerals by a co-tenant does not constitute adverse possession 
against non-producing co-tenants. Since, under the two-year statute, exclusive possession 
is required to begin the running of the limitations period, the statutory period never began to 
run. Thus, the severed one-half owner could quiet title and set aside the void tax sale. 
Entirely too often these days a lawyer who should know better claims that production 
from a unit where his client was neither leased nor integrated constituted a trespass. There 
may even be a few poorly written appellate opinions out there which thus misuse the T word 
in that fashion. Wrong, Wrong, Wrong. The integration order made all owners within the unit 
into co-tenants.23 
FEDERAL APPEALS COURT AFFIRMS SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING LEASE CANCELLATION 
SUIT BECAUSE OF LESSORS’ FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE OF ALLEGED BREACH AND 
OPPORTUNITY TO CURE 
22Ark.Code Ann. § 18-61-106(a) (Repl. 2003). 
23 As discussed above, prior to the integration statute, such conduct was licensed 
capture, which is not an actionable trespass either. 
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In 2013, United States District Judge Susan Hickey dismissed a lease 
cancellation suit based upon alleged failure to develop formations outside of an existing 
secondary recovery unit, because the lessors had not given notice of the alleged 
breach to the lessees prior to filing suit.24 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has now 
affirmed that ruling.25 26 27 Several of the plaintiffs’ leases contained express “notice and 
cure” provisions, with which they failed to comply. As to leases without such provisions, 
the court applied the common law requirement of notice of breach prior to suit for 
cancellation. The appeals court refused to consider arguments based upon the 
Arkansas Supreme Court’s decisions in such cases as Byrd v. Bradham26 and 
Mansfield Gas Co. v. Parkhiii27 both of which had held that such common law notice 
was not required after inactivity for an unreasonable duration, because those 
arguments were not raised by the lessors in the district court. 
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMS SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING CASE INVOLVING 
CONFLICTING OIL AND GAS LEASES BETWEEN SAME PARTIES 
Sabine River Land Company, leasing for XTO Energy Inc., obtained a ten-year oil and 
gas lease (the “first lease”) from the McDougals on January 11, 2005. Sabine apparently then 
discovered that the McDougals’ interest was subject to a life estate vested in an unleased 
party and thus informed the McDougals that their lease was 
                                            
24Lewis v. EnerQuest Oil & Gas, LLC, 2013 WL 222568. 
25Lewis v. EnerQuest Oil & Gas, LLC, 792 F.3d 872, (8th Cir. 2015). 
26280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983). 
27114 Ark. 419, 169 S.W. 957 (1930). 
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“invalid.” 
On March 29, 2005 the McDougals obtained a conveyance from the life tenant. Then, 
on March 30, 2005 they executed another lease (the “second lease”), also in favor of Sabine, 
this time for a five year term. For unknown reasons, the second lease was never recorded. On 
March 31, 2006, Sabine assigned the first lease to XTO Energy Inc., but not the second lease. 
XTO recorded the assignment on April 6, 2006. 
Shortly before the March 30, 2010 expiration of the second lease, the McDougals 
contacted XTO, inquiring whether XTO wished to renew the lease. XTO answered that its 
lease (the first lease) was still well within its primary term. The McDougals sued in May 2013, 
contending that the second lease, which had expired, was the only valid lease. The trial court 
dismissed the complaint, holding that Arkansas’ five-year statute of limitations on written 
contracts barred the action. In McDougal v. Sabine River Land Company28 the Arkansas 
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the latest date from which limitations began to run was 
April 6, 2006, the date XTO recorded the ten-year lease, which was more than five years prior 
to suit being filed. 
ARKANSAS APPEALS COURT AFFIRMS SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR SEVERED MINERAL 
OWNER-REJECTS SURFACE OWNER’S "ABANDONMENT" THEORY 
Myrtle Stevens is the current owner of the surface, but not the minerals, of a forty-acre 
tract, owned by her family since 1904. All of the minerals beneath the tract were conveyed by 
a 1930 mineral deed from her grandfather in favor of W.E. Hall, a prolific mineral buyer in the 
area at that time. Ms. Stevens nevertheless claimed the minerals, contending that the 1930 
deed to Hall was void for irregularities or, 
282015 Ark. App. 281. 
302015 Ark. App. 203, 467 S.W.3d 161. 
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alternatively, that Hall’s heirs had abandoned the mineral interest. Ms. Stevens sued the Hall 
heirs’ lessee, SEECO, Inc., which had developed the unit in which the tract was located. The 
trial court ruled that the mineral deed was valid and entered summary judgment for SEECO. 
In Stevens v. SEECO, Inc.29 the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. The appeals 
court agreed that the deed was valid and it refused to consider Ms. Stevens’ abandonment 
argument as not adequately raised in the lower court. 
The most important feature of the decision was the concurring opinion of Judge 
Brandon Harrison. Judge Harrison explained that there was no Arkansas precedent for 
abandonment of a severed mineral interest, nor does Arkansas have statutory termination of 
mineral interests through non-use. He then expressed doubt whether, absent such a statute, 
a severed mineral interest, being a perpetual interest in the oil and gas in place, could ever be 
subject to abandonment. 
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS VOIDS 1984 QUIET TITLE DECREE FOR FAILURE OF SERVICE 
XTO Energy, Inc. v. Thacker30 was a complicated case with numerous parties 
asserting numerous claims. Central was a 1984 quiet title decree which purported to 
extinguish a 1929 mineral severance. XTO and other appellants argued that the decree, 
though 31 years old, was void because necessary parties, the ancestors of XTO’s lessors, 
were not actually served and it could not be established that the successful plaintiffs at the 
time had exercised due diligence in their efforts to locate 
                                            
292015 Ark. App. 322. 
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those parties, prior to constructive service by warning order. There also were other procedural 
irregularities in the 1984 suit mentioned in the appeals court’s opinion, authored by Judge 
Abramson. While the Court of Appeals expressed reluctance to void a decree which had long 
been relied upon, it nevertheless reversed the circuit court’s ruling which had upheld the 
decree. 
Well, that wraps up the 2015 report. Hopefully we will all be back next year for 
more. 
